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Abstract
In the last decade, China has risen as a very visible player in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), through its foreign aid, its investments and its bilateral trade. While extensive research has 
been conducted on Chinese aid to Africa, this paper will focus instead on the Chinese aid to LAC. 
After an overview of the historical evolution of Chinese aid to the region, and an attempt to quantify 
the amount of Chinese aid received by LAC as compared to other developing regions, this paper 
considers the three main motives which may drive China to provide aid, such as the needs of the 
recipient, the institutional characteristics of the beneficiary, and the political and economic interests 
of the donor country. The article concludes with an appraisal of the potential benefits and negative 
impacts of the Sino-LAC relationship, finding among potential concerns the unconditionality of 
Chinese foreign aid and its unbalanced trade relationship with the region.
Keywords: China’s Foreign Aid, Emerging Donors, Aid Allocation, Latin American and the 
Caribbean.
Resumen 
En la última década, China se ha posicionado como un actor muy visible en América Latina y el 
Caribe (ALC), a través de su ayuda externa, sus inversiones y su comercio bilateral. Aunque existe 
una amplia literatura e investigación sobre los efectos de la ayuda china a África, este documento 
se centrará en la ayuda china a ALC. Después de una visión general de la evolución histórica de 
la ayuda china a la región y un intento de cuantificar la cantidad de ayuda china recibida por ALC 
en comparación con otras regiones en desarrollo, este trabajo considera que son tres los motivos 
principales que pueden conducir a China a proporcionar ayuda, tales como la necesidad del 
receptor, las características institucionales del beneficiario y los intereses políticos y económicos del 
país donante. El artículo concluye con una evaluación de los beneficios potenciales y los impactos 
negativos de la relación sino-latinoamericana, encontrando entre posibles preocupaciones la 
incondicionalidad de la ayuda externa china y su desequilibrada relación comercial con la región.
Palabras clave: Ayuda Oficial de China, Donantes emergentes, Asignación de la ayuda, 
America Latina y el Caribe. 
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Introduction
In the last decades China has been able 
to increase its influence on global affairs and 
development, due to its rapid expansion of 
GDP and trade volumes, through several 
channels which include its foreign aid and 
strategic trade relationships, which in turn are 
used as a tool to further its strategic interests 
in developing regions such as Africa, South 
Asia and Latin America. While substantial 
research has been conducted in relation to 
Chinese aid to Africa, its aid to Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) has been given 
scarce consideration, despite the potential 
influence of Chinese financial flows over the 
region. In fact, upon entering the new century, 
the assistance provided to Latin America has 
sharply raised, both in terms of the number of 
recipient countries and in amount. From 2005 
to 2012, China has provided to Latin American 
countries more than $87 billion USD in loans. 
In 2010, China’s loan commitments to Latin 
America of $37 billion USD were more for that 
year than the combined World Bank’s, Inter-
American Development Bank’s and the United 
States Export-Import Bank’s loans (Gallagher 
et al., 2012). Actually, China pledged to direct 
a quarter trillion dollars (250 billions) to the 
region during the next decade (2015-2025) 
(Watson, 2015).
This article has the objective to analyze the 
evolution and prospects of Chinese foreign 
aid to LAC. In the first section, it presents an 
overview of its historical evolution, dividing the 
history of aid provision by China in six phases, 
each of which responds to different strategic 
imperatives. The second section will take into 
account the different quantitative measures and 
estimates of Chinese aid, as well as the type of 
projects implemented, including an attempt to 
quantify the amount of aid received by LAC as 
compared to other developing regions. The third 
section delves into the different motivations and 
strategic interests of the Sino-Latin America 
aid and trade relations, focusing on three main 
groups of motives for providing aid: the need of 
the recipient, the institutional characteristics of 
the beneficiary, and the political and economic 
interests of the donor country. The fourth section 
provides an overview of the potential benefits, 
as well as the negative effects, of Chinese 
unconditional foreign aid and of its unbalanced 
trade relationship with the region.
I. Six phases of Chinese aid to Latin 
America and the Caribbean
After the Chinese Communist Party took 
control of mainland China, after the defeat 
and resettlement of the Nationalist Party to 
Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China started 
delivering foreign aid to developing nations 
in 1950, by providing aid assistance to North 
Korea.  Following the 1956 Bandung Asian-
African Conference, China extended its aid 
(consisting of donations and interest-free 
loans) to non-Communist countries, such as 
Cambodia, Egypt and Nepal (Bartke, 1989). 
Since then, six phases in China’s aid delivery 
can be identified. I summarize them below.
i) The first phase of Chinese aid (1956-
1969) had been primarily motivated by political/
ideological considerations. Indeed, China 
backed the independence movements of 
African countries, and had used foreign aid to 
sustain the struggle versus colonial powers 
(Davies, 2007). On the other hand, the founding 
principles of Chinese aid provision emphasized 
the self-sufficiency of recipient nations, as 
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well as mutual benefit (Bartke, 1989; Dreher & 
Fuchs, 2012); such doctrine was formalized in 
1964 in the “Eight Principles for Economic Aid 
and Technical Assistance to Other Countries” 
(State Council, 2011). Latin American countries 
were reluctant to establish diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic of China in Beijing, 
recognizing instead the Republic of China in 
Taiwan as the legitimate government of the 
Chinese people (Hearn & León-Manríquez, 
2011, p.6). Between the 1950s and 1970s, in 
fact, Latin American governments were steadily 
anti-communist and pro-Washington, with the 
only exception of Cuba; as such, Cuba was the 
only Latin American nation to establish formal 
diplomatic relations with China and to receive 
its assistance. From 1959 (when Castro took 
power in Cuba) to 1965, both countries signed 
two five-year agreements and several annual 
trade agreements under which China pledged to 
support Cuba through preferential trade policies, 
interest-free loans and material assistance, 
among others (State Council, 2011). 
ii) The 9th Congress of Chinese Communist 
Party, held in 1969, is understood to be the 
beginning of the second phase (1970-1978) 
of Chinese aid; since then, the quantity of aid 
provided increased, in agreement with Chairman 
Mao Zedong’s strategy of assuming political 
guidance of the Third World. Such strategy 
included the promotion and formation “of Maoist 
factions in the Communist parties of Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and others” (Hearn & 
León-Manríquez, 2011, p.8). Chinese attempts 
to spread communist revolutions in the region 
declined in the late 1970s, when negotiations 
with Nixon’s presidency in the United States led 
China to seek more friendly diplomatic ties with 
developing countries (Hearn & León-Manríquez, 
2011, p.9). In accordance with the claim of 
increased international recognition, in 1971 
China substituted Taiwan in the UN Security 
Council; supposedly, the flows of aid to the African 
countries guaranteed the necessary support to 
obtain this position (Davies, 2007). Following 
the demise of Communist Party Vice-President 
Lin Biao in 1973, nevertheless, foreign aid was 
compressed under the leadership of Premier 
Zhou Enlai (Bartke, 1989; Dreher & Fuchs, 
2012). However, the 1970s were marked by 
an increase in the number of countries that 
established diplomatic relations with China, 
as did the recipients of Chinese aid in the LAC 
region, including Chile, Peru, Guyana, Jamaica, 
and others. According to treaties signed between 
China and these countries, the Asian country 
offered loans without interest for cooperation 
in sectors such as agriculture and textiles. In 
addition, the Chinese Red Cross provided 
financial assistance on numerous occasions to 
Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala in Central 
America to alleviate the aftermath of natural 
disasters (State Council, 2011).
iii) The third phase (1979-89) of Chinese 
aid began after the deaths of Mao Zedong 
and Zhou Enlai in 1976, when Deng Xiaoping 
assumed the direction of the Communist Party 
of China in 1978. The new leader implemented 
more pragmatic decisions about its foreign 
policy (including revised aid policies) and 
China opened its doors to the West. The 
economic reform package (called “reform 
and opening up”) began to introduce market 
principles, as well as gradually granting access 
to the Chinese economy to foreign capital 
investment and international trade. Economic 
concerns started to be more significant for 
decisions on foreign aid budget allocation, and 
China started to form stronger relationships 
with developing regions.  Assistance  to  Latin 
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America  was  characterized  by  numerous 
small-scale  individual  projects,  and “mutually 
advantageous” programs were promoted 
(OECD, 1987). China began to foster South-
South cooperation, as well as economic 
and technological cooperation, both guided 
by the principles of equality, mutual benefit, 
effectiveness, diversification and common 
development (State Council, 2011). Although 
Chinese aid had initially offered aid in the 
form of subsidies or long-term credits without 
interest, the conditions in the 1980s became 
stricter yet still advantageous for Latin 
American countries, which in turn started their 
own process of opening their economies to 
the global market. It was during this decade 
that China gave a new focus to its foreign aid, 
emphasizing the improvement and maintaining 
of existing programs (Bartke, 1989; Dreher & 
Fuchs, 2012).
iv) The fourth phase (1990-1995) began 
following the Tiananmen Square episode 
in 1989, when China energetically pursued 
diplomatic support and considerably boosted 
its foreign aid. In particular, aid to African nations 
increased (Taylor, 1998; Brautigam, 2008, 
2010; Dreher & Fuchs, 2012).  In Africa, indeed, 
responses to the slaughter were substantially 
milder compared to reactions from the West, to 
the extent that some African countries were even 
supportive of the actions undertaken (Taylor, 
1998). As  Taylor  puts it (1998, p.450), such 
aid policies were a “quick and comparatively 
cheap way by which Beijing could reward 
those countries that had stood by China” 
during the crisis, in addition to strengthening 
relationships.  On  the  other  hand,  in the late 
1980s China strengthened its “checkbook 
diplomacy”, as a reaction to Taiwan’s transition 
to democracy, which led to an increased 
recognition to the ROC; in fact, seven countries 
(Belize, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Bahamas, 
Grenada, Liberia, and Lesotho) switched back 
their diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. Such a 
rivalry produced sort of a “bidding war” in which 
offers of aid by both sides escalated (Brautigam, 
2010, p.11; Rich, 2009).  Additionally, after 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, Chinese 
international relations became less ideological 
(Hearn & León-Manríquez, 2011, p.12). The 
literature stresses the importance of economic 
considerations, which have increasingly 
become China’s predominant aid strategy 
(Davies, 2007; Pehnelt, 2007). In fact, Chinese 
planners were conscious that the scarcity of 
resources, mainly in domestic energy, could 
rapidly hinder domestic production; to counter 
that, they operated “to position the country to 
overcome that challenge” (Brautigam, 2008, 
p.11). Specifically, foreign aid restructurings of 
1995 headed towards market-oriented attitudes 
and highlighted the connection between aid, 
commerce and investment (Brautigam, 2009; 
Dreher & Fuchs, 2012). 
v) Following this market-oriented 
reform, China’s aid activities entered an entirely 
different period compared to earlier stages 
(Kobayashi, 2008, p.7; Dreher & Fuchs, 2012), 
thus constituting the beginning for the fifth 
phase (1996-2005). The central objective of 
the reorganization was to increase the modes 
of delivery of foreign financing to developing 
nations. Apart of donations and interest-free 
credits (flexible and rapid financing forms), 
China also conceded preferential loans with 
subsidized interest, together with joint ventures 
and participation in comprehensive international 
cooperation projects and programs. China 
announced a twofold increase in its aid effort 
to Africa in order to “achieve the goal of 
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mutual benefit and win-win  between  China 
and  African  countries»  (Ministry  of  Commerce, 
2007,  p.416).  At the turn of the new century, 
China underwent enormous development and 
became one of the most important economies 
in the world; it also increased the assistance it 
provides to Latin America, both in the number 
of receiving countries and in the amount 
disbursed. In 2004, the Forum for Economic 
and Trade Cooperation between China and the 
region is established.
vi) The most recent era for China’s aid 
program allegedly began in 2006, with China 
announcing a “new strategic partnership” 
in the context of the Forum of China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), when  President Hu 
Jintao proclaimed the creation of the China-
Africa Development Fund to advance Chinese 
investment in Africa with US$1 billion, 
expected to grow to US$5 billion, as well as 
announcing to double its aid effort to Africa from 
2006 to 2009, with the aim of achieving the goal 
of mutual benefit and win-win between the PRC 
and African nations (Ministry of Commerce, 
2009, p.416). 
The growing importance of the links between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean 
can be identified in five milestones during the 
most recent phase (2006-2016) (CEPAL, 2015, 
p.6). The first one is the publication in 2008 of 
the White Book on foreign relations between 
China and the region, a policy paper in which 
China exhibited at various points the orientation 
of their aid policies and development of bilateral 
relations, and explained its preliminary plans1. 
A second milestone is the 2012 proposition 
1 In the first “Paper on China’s policy towards Latin 
America and the Caribbean”,  the  following  preliminary 
plans are explicated  in five points:  (1) Continue  to provide 
economic  and  technological  assistance  without  imposing 
any political conditions and gradually  increasing aid  to  the 
by Premier Wen Jiabao, during a visit to the 
ECLAC (UN Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean), to strengthen 
political, economic and cooperation relations 
between China and LAC. A third turning point is 
the ambitious cooperation framework for 2015-
2019, generally known as “1+3+6”, which was 
proposed in 2014 in Brazil at the first Summit 
of Leaders of China and LAC by President Xi 
Jinping. In this plan, “1” stands for “one plan”, 
referring to the 2015-2019 comprehensive 
plan, aimed at achieving inclusive growth 
and sustainable development; “3” stands for 
“three engines”, indicating the promotion of 
cooperation through trade, investment and 
financial co-operation; “6”, finally, stands for 
“six fields”, which refer to fostering industry 
connection in six co-operation priorities (energy 
and resources, infrastructure construction, 
agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and 
technological innovation, and information 
technologies). The fourth milestone is the joint 
adoption of the Cooperation Plan 2015-2019, 
at the First Ministerial Meeting of the CELAC2-
China Forum, held in Beijing in 2015. This 
best of its ability, according to the needs of Latin American 
countries.  (2) Actively explore with relevant countries ways 
to  resolve  their  external  debt  problems  with  China  in  the 
context of policies on debt  reduction and debt elimination. 
(3)  Strongly  respond  to  requests  from  Latin  American 
countries when urgent situations of humanitarian crisis arise 
and  promote  and  support  the  exchange  and  cooperation 
between  non-governmental  organizations  in  China  and 
the  Latin  American  region.  (4)  Implement  technological 
training  programs  in  the  agricultural,  energy,  health  and 
environmental  protection  sectors;  Provide  technological 
services and increase the number of government grants. (5) 
Actively promote medical and health cooperation with Latin 
American countries, continuing to send medical teams with 
the appropriate materials and medicines to improve medical 
facilities  in  the  recipient  countries  (Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs, 2008).
2 The CELAC, Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (Spanish: Comunidad de Estados 
Latinoamericanos y Caribeños), is a representative 
bloc instituted in 2011 for the purpose of coordination, 
harmonization and deepening of Latin American integration, 
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document is a broad plan which considers 
thirteen thematic areas of work, eight of which 
are concentrated in economic areas3. However, 
for the moment, this plan only indicates general 
objectives and broad lines of action, that have to 
be assumed to serve as a guideline for specific 
initiatives and projects, which supposes a 
strong challenge for politician and technicians, 
in order to allow the deepening of the relation 
and dialogue between CELAC and China; for 
the time being, the Asian country established a 
secretariat in order to monitor progress in such 
areas. The fifth and most recent breakthrough 
is the nine-day grand tour of official visits by 
Prime Minister Li Keqiang to Latin America 
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and, finally, to 
ECLAC headquarters in Santiago) in 2015, 
where he made clear that, despite decelerating 
growth on both sides of the Pacific, China will 
be contributing much more to the region in 
the forthcoming years, allocating many more 
billions and promising the construction of a 
trans-Amazon railway connecting Peru and 
Brazil, to enable China to cheaply import 
Brazilian iron and soy (CEPAL, 2015).
Regarding specifically the Caribbean 
nations, at the II Forum on Economic and Trade 
Cooperation between China and Caribbean 
held in 2007, China defined its proposal on 
the assistance it would provide in the following 
three years to the countries of the region with 
whom it maintains friendly relations. This 
proposal included granting preferential loans 
consisting of 33 sovereign countries in the region.
3 Areas of work concentrated on economic fields 
are: Trade, Investment and Finance, Infrastructure and 
Transport, Energy and natural resources, Agriculture, 
Industry, Science and Technology, Aviation and the 
Aerospace Industry, Human Resources Education and 
Training, Tourism and Environmental Protection, Risk 
Management and Disaster Reduction, Poverty Eradication 
and Health.
worth 4,000 million yuan (more than 526 million 
2007 USD), conducting training programs 
for 2,000 people and sending agricultural 
experts, Chinese language teachers and 
medical teams to the region. After that, China 
has been actively executing the aid measures 
to Caribbean nations revealed at the III China-
Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation 
Forum held in 2011. By the end of 2012, 
under such framework, China had delivered 
concessional loans (totaling 3 billion yuan, 
450 million USD) to the Caribbean countries, 
primarily for the construction of infrastructure 
projects. Meanwhile, China trained over 500 
officials and technical staff for the Caribbean 
countries, and held training courses for these 
countries, to establish earthquake and tsunami 
early warning and monitoring systems. China 
also built schools in Antigua & Barbuda and 
Dominica, sent medical teams and trained 
local medical staff in Dominica, and completed 
technical cooperation projects in agriculture 
and fishery in Dominica, Grenada and Cuba 
(State Council, 2014).  
II. Amount and type of Chinese aid 
to Latin America and the Caribbean
Quantifying Chinese aid - When conducting 
empirical research on Chinese aid budget 
allocation, the main operative problem is that 
the Chinese government declines to publish 
full information on its annual bilateral aid 
allocations. Hence, estimations of the total size 
of China’s aid flows vary considerably. Part of 
the variation is stemming from the different 
delimitations of which flows are considered as 
development aid and which are not. Estimates 
show that Chinese aid has rapidly increased 
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during the past decade. The United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), estimates aid for Africa amounting 
to US$1.3-1.4 in 2006; professor Qi (2007) 
estimates that aid for Africa in 2007 was worth 
US$1.05 billion, being US$1.38 China’s total 
aid budget for that year. Between 2000 and 
2013, Chinese development finance datasets 
show 2,312 projects in 50 countries, totaling 
$94.31 billion. According to the Financial Times’ 
estimates, China outperformed the World Bank 
as the world’s largest provider of overseas 
loans to developing countries through its China 
Development Bank and China Export-Import 
Bank, amounting to at least US$110 billion in 
2009 and 2010. 
According to the Inter-American Dialogue 
database, during the sixth phase (2006-2016) 
China gave growing amounts of loans to the 
region (see Fig.1 below) covering different 
areas (in particular infrastructure, energy, and 
mining). 
Fig.1 - Total amount of loans from China to Latin America and the Caribbean (2005-2016)
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Gallagher & Myers (2016)
Venezuela is by far the country that has 
received the most loans from the PRC in the 
region, with 17 loans totaling $62,2 billion. 
Brazil was second, with ten loans totaling $36.8 
billion, followed by Argentina (8 loans, $15.3 
billion), Ecuador (13 loans, $17.4 billion), and 
Bolivia (10 loans, $3.5 billion) (Gallagher & 
Myers, 2016). Figures for the period 2006-2016 
are presented in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 - Loans provided by China to countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the sixth phase of 
Chinese aid (2006-2016)
Country Number of Loans Amount (USD millions)
Venezuela 17 62,200
Brazil 10 36,800
Ecuador 13 17,400
Argentina 8 15,300
Bolivia 10 3,500
Trinidad & Tobago 2 2,600
Jamaica 10 1,800
Mexico 1 1,000
Costa Rica 1 395
Barbados 1 170
Guyana 1 130
Bahamas 2 99
Peru 1 50
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Gallagher & Myers (2016)
With the intention of silencing objections that 
China does not provide sufficient information 
on its aid program, the Chinese government 
published two White Papers on China’s Foreign 
Aid in 2011 and 2014 (State Council, 2011, 
2014; Dreher & Fuchs, 2012). According to 
these official documents, China has provided 
aid to 161 countries until 2009, of which 123 
developing countries received aid on a regular 
basis. This corresponds to 256.29 billion yuan 
($38.54 billion USD), of which 41.4% were 
provided as grants, 29.9% as interest-free 
loans, and 28.7% in the form of concessional 
loans (State Council, 2011). From 2010 to 
2012, China provided assistance to 121 
countries: 30 in Asia, 51 in Africa, 9 in Oceania, 
19 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
12 in Europe. China allocated a total of 89.34 
billion yuan (14.41 billion U.S. dollars) for 
foreign assistance. Grants were 36.2 percent 
of the total assistance volume (32.32 billion 
yuan, 4.8 billion USD), interest-free loans were 
8.1 percent of its foreign assistance volume 
(7.26 billion yuan, approximately 1 billion USD), 
concessional loans amounted to 55.7 percent 
of the total (49.76 billion yuan, 7 billion USD) 
in the same period (State Council, 2014). Still, 
it is not clear which financial flows are included 
in these calculations. Missing information 
on the degree of concessionality of Chinese 
loans makes it difficult to apply the definition of 
official development assistance (ODA) from the 
DAC4. For this reason, few econometric studies 
have verified the causal mechanisms behind 
Chinese aid with hard data, and speculative 
4 Official Development Aid (ODA) is defined as 
concessional financial flows to developing countries that 
are provided by official agencies, with the objective to 
promote economic development and welfare and that 
contain a grant element of at least 25%.
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/14/26415658.PDF).
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claims about foreign aid from China remain 
mostly unchallenged. 
AidData (Hawkins, 2010) provides 
project-level data for non-OECD suppliers of 
international development finance, such as 
China, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which do not 
publish their own project-level data. In particular, 
they have tracked Chinese development 
finance to African countries for 2000 thru 2012, 
and used these methods to create a detailed 
project-level database of official Chinese 
development finance flows to Africa from 
2000 to 2012. This database includes more 
than 1,950 pledged, initiated, and completed 
projects, worth over $84 billion USD. Dreher 
& Fuchs (2012) make use of AidData and 
various other datasets covering 1956-2006, 
to empirically test to which extent political and 
commercial interests shape China’s global 
aid allocation decisions. They estimate the 
determinants of China’s allocation of project aid, 
food aid, medical staff and total aid money to all 
developing countries, comparing its allocation 
decisions with traditional and other so-called 
emerging donors; these authors conclude 
that political considerations are an important 
determinant of global China’s allocation of aid 
and that it remains independent of democracy 
and governance in recipient countries. They 
also find no evidence that China’s aid allocation 
is dominated by natural resource endowments.
Another difficulty in doing econometric 
analysis of foreign aid is that global aid suffers 
great volatility: amounts of aid allocated each 
year, in general, vary substantially. Chinese 
aid is no exception, as shown by Figure 1, 
presenting a wide volatility in both the number 
of project completed and aid amounts.
Figure 1 – Volatility of Chinese aid across time (number of projects completed, and amount of aid in millions 
constant 2000 USD)
Source: Dreher and Fuchs (2012)
When conducting econometric research 
about foreign aid budget allocation, Gupta et al. 
(2006) recommend grouping foreign aid budget 
allocation and projects by phases, and not by 
single year, due to aid volatility. Following this 
suggestion, I estimate the relative importance 
of each region of the developing world for 
China foreign aid budget allocation in the six 
phases described in the first section, using 
datasets from Dreher and Fuchs (2012) and 
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AidData (Hawkins, 2010). Conducting this 
exercise allows to visually represent the relative 
importance of Latin America and the Caribbean 
across time, as compared to other developing 
regions.
Figure 3 – Chinese aid to different developing regions (number of completed projects as % of total)
As illustrated in Figure 3, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is constantly the greatest recipient of 
Chinese project aid, accounting for more than 
40% of projects throughout all phases. East 
Asia and Pacific, important due to geographical 
proximity, is the second region most benefitted, 
in the first, fifth and sixth phases. Latin America 
and the Caribbean received less aid than both 
the Middle East and North Africa and South 
Asia in the first three phases, until the fall of 
Soviet Union. It is only after 1990 that China 
increased the relative number of projects in 
the LAC region, which is in line with those 
regions in the fourth, fifth and sixth phases, 
obtaining around 10% of total Chinese aid 
projects. Coming to the amounts of aid, as 
shown by Figure 4 below, we can see that the 
share of Chinese aid allocated to Latin America 
and Caribbean has passed from less than 
5% to 20% of its total budget, and it is now 
comparable with the amount of aid received by 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  These combined figures 
show that Chinese aid has a special focus on 
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially regarding the 
number of projects; nevertheless, it maintains 
a global outlook, providing substantial levels of 
aid to all developing regions. Looking at LAC 
in particular, we can appreciate that while the 
share of aid projects remained substantially 
constant, the amount of aid provided has 
sharply increased in the last decade, reflecting 
the fact that greater attention is dedicated to the 
region, and bigger financial flows are dedicated 
by China to LAC, both in absolute terms and 
relative to the rest of the world.
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Figure 4 – Chinese aid to different developing regions (number of completed projects as % of total)
Types of aid - Beginning in the 1990s, the 
reform of methods for providing aid to the 
outside world was deepened, diversifying and 
making them more flexible. The types of aid 
provided by China to the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean can be divided 
into six types: (i) humanitarian assistance, (ii) 
free material assistance, (iii) preferential loans, 
(iv) infrastructure construction, (v) vocational 
training programs and (vi) support to local 
organizations. They are summarized below:
i) First, humanitarian assistance was rapidly 
developed in emergency situations. China 
provided timely assistance, both financially 
and through donations/shipments of medical 
equipment, among others. Between 2003 and 
2010, according to Chinese State Council, China 
has provided this type of assistance on more than 
30 occasions to countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, including Cuba, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Peru, Chile and Haiti. Of these, and despite having 
not yet established formal diplomatic relations 
with China, Haiti was conceded 93 million yuan 
(approximately 13.7 million 2010 USD) after the 
devastating earthquake of 2010 (State Council, 
2011). In 2012, China helped Cuba to relief the 
consequences of hurricane Sandy, providing 100 
tons of humanitarian aid (State Council, 2014)
ii) There has also been a significant increase 
in free material assistance. According to official 
data, in the 1990s, China made over 30 donations 
of industrial supplies, such as bicycles, 
agricultural and/or medical equipment, among 
others; between 2000 and 2008, this type of aid 
has multiplied, registering almost 50 donations, 
including telecommunications equipment, 
office supplies, cultural and sporting goods, and 
others, with an increasingly high technological 
content (State Council, 2011). Between 
2010 and 2012, under the Strengthening 
Environmental Protection program addressing 
climate change, China donated energy-efficient 
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products to the Caribbean island of Grenada 
(State Council, 2014).
iii) Preferential loans play a predominant role 
in foreign aid. Prior to 1995, China’s assistance 
to Latin America consisted primarily of interest-
free loans. Since the end of the 1990s, 
especially between 2003 and 2008, aid has 
been extended to preferential loans which has 
been granted on 23 occasions to 11 countries, 
including the Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname and 
Bolivia. As for the reduction and elimination of 
foreign debt, in 2006 China cancelled all the 
debts of Guyana (which had expired at the end 
of 2004) and two debts of Bolivia (which were 
due to expire in 2007) (State Council, 2011).
iv) Fourth, between 2003 and 2008, 
China has carried out several infrastructure 
construction projects in Latin America. Among 
the more than 40 works of this type carried out 
in 15 countries (such as Cuba, the Bahamas 
or Granada), the projects that stand out the 
most are the stadiums, convention centers, 
highways, hydroelectric power stations, 
hospitals and agricultural production centers 
(State Council, 2011). By 2012, China had 
offered concessional loans for the construction 
of infrastructure projects in the Caribbean 
nations, totaling 3 billion yuan (450 million 
USD) (State Council, 2014).
v) Vocational training programs have also 
increased, becoming an important element 
of China’s external assistance to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, focusing on 
sectors such as agriculture, mining, trade and 
administration. The implementation of these 
training programs has been accompanied by the 
participation of many young Chinese volunteers 
to provide assistance in diverse fields such as 
education, agriculture and medicine (State 
Council, 2011).
vi) Sixth and last, China has begun to 
provide assistance to local Latin American 
organizations: between 1998 and 2002, China 
made numerous donations to the Caribbean 
Development Bank; in July 2005, they donated 
computer equipment to the secretariat of 
the Andean Community; between 2005 and 
2009, a $ 2million USD grant established the 
China-Organization of American States (OAS) 
fund; finally, in January 2009 China donated 
$350 USD million to the Inter-American 
Development Bank to support economic 
development and poverty reduction in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (State Council, 
2011).
III. Motivations behind China’s aid 
allocation
China prides itself that its aid is 
unconditional, not linked to conditions normally 
imposed by Western donors, such as good 
practices, democracy and/or respect for human 
rights. In addition, Chinese financial assistance 
usually becomes readily available, without 
much bureaucracy (Davies, 2007). China 
therefore constitutes a good alternative to the 
donors of the OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC-CAD), with their very detailed 
bureaucratic procedures and conditionality 
policies. The best evidence of the preference 
for unconditional aid in Africa is the case of 
Angola, a country with very high levels of 
corruption, which has big difficulties to access 
Western aid; unsurprisingly, a major recipient 
of Chinese aid5. In Latin America, for instance, 
5 In the early 2000s, Angola rejected a conditional 
loan from the IMF, finding instead a more attractive 
“unconditional” loan from China, valued at 2 billion USD. In 
turn, Angola provided 40 thousand oil barrels to China per 
day (Sun, 2014).
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Chinese aid to Venezuela has occupied the void 
generated by the shortage of loans by the World 
Bank. Nevertheless, unconditional aid to oil-
rich countries such as Venezuela and Angola 
can increase the risk of political disruption 
and corruption (Sanderson, 2013; Ellis, 2009; 
Brautigam, 2009). At the same time, China’s 
development aid is criticized for being driven 
by domestic economic and political interests, to 
a greater extent than development assistance 
from traditional DAC donors. 
The motives that generally move all donor 
countries to the granting of international aid can 
be grouped into three categories: (i) first, aid 
must depend on need of recipients; (ii) secondly, 
the quality of recipient’s policies and institutions 
could be important; and (iii) third, the donor’s 
own political and commercial interests play 
a role (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The following 
paragraphs discuss these three groups of 
motives, focusing on the case of China.
i) In relation to poverty and development, the 
Ministry of Commerce (1985, p.413) stresses 
how its aid projects play “a positive role in 
the expansion of the national economies of 
the recipient countries and the improvement 
of the material and cultural life of people in 
these countries”. The Ministry emphasizes the 
idea of “mutual benefit”, in order to develop 
national economies of recipient countries and 
to promote economic growth both in China 
and those countries (Ministry of Commerce, 
1985, p.413). The Chinese State Council 
underlines how the budget allocation of its aid 
meets the needs of the recipients, saying that 
China assigns primary importance to recipient 
countries living conditions and economic 
development, setting efforts to ensure that its 
foreign aid benefits as many people in need as 
possible (State Council, 2011, p.6). Brautigam 
(2008) points out that China uses its foreign aid 
to show its vision-of-self as a great power that is 
responsible, meaningful, fast in humanitarian aid 
delivery (p.7). Chinese focus on infrastructure 
projects could assess development needs 
largely neglected by DAC donors (Brautigam, 
2008). However, these views contradict to a 
large extent what is argued by Naim (2007), 
that “rogue” donors like China don’t care about 
the long-term well-being of the population of 
recipient countries (p.95).
ii) The second group of motivations to donate 
aid is related to the quality of institutions and the 
governance of recipient countries. This is true 
when we talk about donor countries from the 
West, for two main reasons. First, (a) traditional 
donor countries use aid as an incentive 
mechanism for recipient countries with good 
institutions; for example, Öhler et al. (2012) 
find that aid conditional on “good governance” 
leads to incentives for potential recipient 
countries to improve their anti-corruption 
controls. Nevertheless, others raise questions 
about the effectiveness of aid for the promotion 
of democracy and governance (Knack, 2004, 
Busse and Gröning, 2009). Second, (b) 
traditional donors may follow a general belief 
that aid is more effective when it is assigned to 
recipients with more rigorous economic policies 
(Burnside and Dollar 2000), although there is 
not enough empirical evidence to support this 
relationship (Easterly et al., 2004). In contrast 
to the motivations of Western donors’ aid, one 
of the fundamental principles of China’s aid 
policy, and in general for its foreign policy, is the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs 
and respect for national sovereignty of recipient 
countries (Davies, 2007; Brautigam, 2008; 
Dreher & Fuchs, 2012). As such, Chinese aid 
allocation is unrelated to the form of regime and 
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quality of governance of recipients. The Ministry 
of Commerce (1990, p.63) states that China 
has “full respect” for the sovereignty of recipient 
countries, and doesn’t attach any condition 
or ask for any privilege, maintaining the “true 
spirit of sincere cooperation”.  Therefore,  we 
can  conclude  that  Chinese  aid  is  probably  not 
affected  by  the  institutional  and governance 
quality of recipient countries. Others have 
even argued that China, priding itself over its 
“no-strings-attached” approach tends to focus 
instead on recipients with fairly bad governance 
(Halper, 2010), providing assistance to 
unstable problematic regions and “delinquent 
states” (Pehnelt, 2007, p.8). In fact, China 
gives considerable amounts of aid to fragile 
states (Kaplinsky et al, 2007; Bermeo, 2011). 
It has been argued that the absence of any 
conditionality of Chinese aid could weaken 
democracy, governance and human rights, limit 
development, weaken social and environmental 
standards, and increase corruption (Davies 
2007). According to Taylor (1998), in fact, China 
has opposed democratization in Africa, since it 
could use the failure of democratic consolidation 
as an argument against domestic demands for 
democratization. As Deng Xiaoping said, “talk 
about human rights, freedom and democracy 
is only designed to safeguard the interests of 
the strong, rich countries [who] practice power 
politics”  (as  quoted  by  Taylor,  1998,  p.453). 
However, it is debatable whether China’s aid 
differs significantly from the distribution of 
DAC aid in terms of rewarding countries with 
better governance: earlier studies reveal a 
considerable difference between the rhetoric 
of DAC and its effective allocation of aid. For 
example, Germany, Finland, France, Japan and 
the Netherlands give the most corrupt countries 
more aid, not less (Isopi & Mattesini, 2010).  
iii) Finally, the offering of foreign assistance 
is composed of (a) economic and (b) political 
motives. On the one hand, (a) in terms of its own 
economic and commercial interests, everything 
that facilitates the export of natural resources 
to China is seen as a central objective of its 
aid; China’s “insatiable needs” for resources 
(hydrocarbons, minerals, and timber in 
particular) are more often cited as trade-related 
reasons for Chinese foreign aid (Alden, 2005; 
Davies, 2007; Naim, 2007; Halper, 2010). The 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce is the lead 
agency for the provision of bilateral aid: this 
clearly indicates the paramount importance of 
trade ratios for China. Lum et al. (2009) suggest 
that Chinese aid to Africa and Latin America is 
determined by economic interests, motivated 
mainly by the extraction of natural resources. 
The vast majority of Latin American exports to 
China have focused on three areas: soy, metals 
and hydrocarbons. In fact, only three products 
(copper, iron and soy) account for more than 
half of Latin American exports to China. Chinese 
trade’s exponential growth has created strong 
ties with Latin America and potential to become 
a key trading partner. Brazil has become the 
third largest exporter of iron to China, while Chile 
and Peru account for 50% of Chinese imports of 
copper. In 2009, seeking increased oil exports, 
the Chinese government approved a $20 billion 
credit to Venezuela and purchased the Brazilian 
share of Repsol (a Spanish oil company) for 
$7.1 billion USD, with the aim of developing 
oil deposits in Brazil (Dowsett & Chen, 2010). 
Furthermore, Gallagher (2012) estimates that 
loans-for-oil constitute more than two-thirds of 
Chinese loans to Latin America. This process 
of increasing Chinese investments in Latin 
America began in 2004, when President Hu 
Jintao promised to invest over a 10-year period 
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intending to reach bilateral trade of $100 billion 
USD. Surprisingly, this mark was surpassed 
much earlier, as bilateral trade had already 
reached $140 billion in 2008 and $261.6 billion 
USD in 2014. At the moment, the US remains 
the main economic partner of the region; China 
surpassed the European Union as the second 
largest trading partner in Latin America in 2014 
(two years earlier than what CEPAL predicted 
in 2011), and could even surpass the US by 
2030 (Hakim and Myers, 2014). Nevertheless, 
Latin America’s lack of diversification and 
dependence on products exported to China 
has exacerbated the region’s vulnerability to 
commodity price fluctuations, as up to 74% of 
all Latin American exports to China are primary 
commodities (Gallagher, 2010). In contrast, the 
majority of Chinese exports to Latin America 
are from the manufacturing sector with a strong 
emphasis on electronics and vehicles; such 
industries, as compared to commodities, are 
much less prone to price volatility, evidencing an 
asymmetric trade relationship. As some scholars 
put it, Chinese trade is pushing Latin America 
into a “raw materials corner”. More bluntly, 
Chinese focus on Latin American raw materials 
and the flood of cheap Chinese products is 
precluding the diversification of the exporting 
industries of Latin American nations, since it is 
more lucrative to merely sell raw materials to 
China than encourage entrepreneurship and 
diversification of the economy, thus stimulating 
an unfavorable “overdependence on natural 
resource exports”. As the NAFTA negotiator 
from Nicaragua put it, “China is an awakening 
monster that can eat us” (as cited in Gallagher 
& Porzecanski, 2008, p.185). 
In addition to secure resources, Chinese 
aid is accused of directing future access to 
export markets and profitable investments6 
(Davies, 2007; Lum et al., 2009). Devlin 
(2007) provides statistics about the one-sided 
relationship, describing how Chile, Argentina, 
and Mexico were the only Latin American 
countries among China’s top 40 suppliers 
in 2002, altogether accounting for just 1.3 
percent of total imports. On the contrary, 
Latin America has become the most dynamic 
export market for Chinese products, with an 
annual growth of 31% between 2005 and 
2010, versus 16% for the rest of the world 
(Toro, 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Gallagher, 
2008); thus the Sino-Latin American trade is 
characterized by a substantial trade deficit. 
6 Medical care, for example, is seen as a tool to enhance 
the reputation of Chinese medicine and as “a smart, low-
cost way to introduce Chinese-made drugs to the African 
market” (Shinn, 2006).
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Figure 4 - China-LAC bilateral trade
China’s exports to world regions Product composition of LAC exports to China
China’s imports from world regions Product composition of China’s exports to LAC
Source: CEPAL, 2009; Leiteritz, 2012.
Furthermore, most Chinese aid is “tied 
aid”, which is another indication that China 
uses foreign aid to improve its business 
opportunities (Pehnelt, 2007; Schüller et al., 
2010).  For instance, when China funded 
the construction of 2.2 billion USD dam in 
Ecuador, over 1,000 Chinese engineers and 
workers were deployed to the Latin American 
country, rather than hiring Ecuadorian workers 
(Krauss & Bradsher, 2015). The Ministry of 
Trade (1999) openly concluded that, through 
aid, Chinese enterprises entered developing 
countries’ markets very quickly and were 
welcomed by those countries’ governments 
and enterprises (p.75).
On the other hand, (b) regarding the political 
motivations of China’s aid allocation, the 
Ministry of Commerce (1996) openly admits 
that aid and subsidies are used to coordinate 
diplomatic work, and that building “some 
public institutions [...] produced great political 
influences” (p.70). The aid program is aimed 
at supporting diplomatic high - level events: 
for example, to achieve greater participation 
of heads of State in the ceremonies of the 
2008 Beijing Olympics, China speeded up the 
implementation of the projects most valued 
by bilateral leaders (Ministry of Commerce, 
2009, p.348). However, according to the State 
Council (2011), China “never uses foreign aid 
as a means to [...] seek political privileges for 
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itself” (p.3). As a matter of fact, the literature 
has paid particular attention to the political 
motivation of allocating aid from China. For 
instance, Africa is important for China’s political 
agenda and building alliances, as it supported 
the People’s Republic to represent China at 
the United Nations instead of Taiwan (Davies, 
2007, p.27). Taiwan, considered by China a 
nonaligned province, has diplomatic relations 
with only twenty countries, with embassies, 
trade agreements and foreign aid, which 
strengthen Taiwan’s effective sovereignty. The 
largest group of those countries (eleven, as 
shown by Table 1 below) is in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, particularly in Central 
America, which maintain this arrangement 
because Taiwan spends heavily to maintain it. 
Nevertheless, Taiwan can difficultly outspend 
mainland China, which uses the aid to impose 
its “One China policy”, rewarding countries 
that do not recognize Taiwan as a separate 
country (Taylor, 1998; Brautigam, 2008, Rich, 
2009). That has been evident in LAC, where 
China invested in costly projects, sometimes in 
exchange for ending diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan; Panama, has been the latest country in 
switching recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 
June 2017. However, despite the “one China” 
policy, the PRC also provides aid to countries 
that recognize Taiwan (Davies, 2007). 
Table 2 – Countries recognizing the PRC or the ROC in Latin America and the Caribbean in June 2017
Countries recognizing 
the PRC (China)
Countries recognizing 
the ROC (Taiwan)
Central America Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
Caribbean
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, 
Trinidad & Tobago
Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. 
Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & 
the Grenadines
South America
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela
Paraguay
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) website: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/
Finally, because of its problematic human 
rights record, China has supported African 
countries to play an important role in preventing 
sanctions against the Asian country (Lancaster, 
2007) in organizations such as the UN Human 
Rights Commission. China, in fact, seems 
determined to increase its influence in such 
international organizations (Taylor, 1998), in 
order to “build coalitions to protect Beijing from 
criticism from the West” (Tull, 2006, p.460). 
In summary, there are four main factors that 
encompass the economic and political interests 
of China in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Ellis, 2009): (1) acquiring primary products, 
(2) cultivating markets for Chinese exports, (3) 
gaining international isolation of Taiwan, and (4) 
securing strategic alliance with Latin America.
However, following the win-win doctrine of 
Chinese foreign aid, Latin America also fulfils 
its own strategic interests in its relationship with 
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China, for three reasons: (1) creating export-
led economic growth, (2) attracting investment 
in hydrocarbon exploration and development, 
and (3) counterbalancing the hegemony of 
the United States (Ellis, 2009; Hearn & León-
Manríquez, 2011).
IV. Potential developments
Chinese aid has been considered as the 
most “rogue” aid among new donors (Naim, 
2007), since it is used to gain diplomatic and 
political support on the international scene, 
it is allocated in order to gain access to raw 
materials and natural resources and open new 
markets for its own manufactured products, and 
it is assigned to fragile and corrupt countries 
undermining the effort of western donors 
towards better governance and rule of law. 
However, aid from DAC and other emerging 
donors has been found to be motivated by 
political self-interest as well. While all donors 
use aid to further their strategic interests, 
China is more open in stressing that its aid is 
favoring its own model of development and 
that it is aimed at mutual benefit. It is clear 
that Chinese cooperation with LAC doesn’t 
follow the traditional rhetoric of giving aid 
on a humanitarian basis, but it privileges a 
South-South cooperation approach, based 
on the exchange of resources, technology, 
and knowledge between developing countries 
perceived as equals, and without obligations 
(since there is no colonial history among 
them). China’s commitment to such approach 
is underlined by the fact that the first time that 
Chinese Government has signed an agreement 
with a multilateral partner, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) in 2010, 
it has been with the aim of strengthening 
South-South cooperation. As president Xi 
Jinping himself described it, while chairing a a 
South-South meeting at the UN, South-South 
cooperation is “a great pioneering measure 
uniting the developing nations together for self-
improvement, is featured by equality, mutual 
trust, mutual benefit, win-win result, solidarity 
and mutual assistance and can help developing 
nations pave a new path for development 
and prosperity” and “as the overall strength 
of developing nations improves, the South-
South cooperation is set to play a bigger role 
in promoting the collective rise of developing 
countries.” 7 Indeed, the relationship between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the past decades can indeed be described as 
a win-win relation: while Latin America needs 
Chinese foreign aid money and needs a buyer 
for its abundant raw materials, China needs 
natural resources and wants to enter developing 
markets to place its manufactured products. 
As it has been suggested in the course of this 
article, LAC experimented both positive and 
negative impacts from Chinese foreign aid 
and bilateral trade. Positive impacts include an 
increased funding for a number of infrastructure 
project and increased trade revenues. 
However, negative impacts could potentially 
outweigh positive effects: the imbalances in 
the relationship and the fluctuations in the 
raw material demand and prices, show that 
China alone may not be enough to sustain 
the development of entire economies in the 
region, which risk falling in the “resource curse”. 
Chinese money also influences the stability 
and the transparency of the region: on the one 
hand, Chinese aid may help to sustain corrupt, 
7 from “China’s boost to South-South cooperation” 
by Martin Khor, published in SouthViews No. 119, 10 
November 2015.
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unethical and inefficient regimes; on the other 
hand, it may also contribute to the stability of 
regimes more committed to democracy. As 
such, the tendencies of retrogression into 
undiversified and deindustrialized economies 
dependent on non-renewable raw resources 
and the increase of corruption prompted by 
Chinese unconditional aid and unbalanced 
trade, could undermine the efforts of traditional 
donors (i.e. World Bank and IMF) towards better 
governance in the region.  
Some authors are optimistic (Devlin, 2007; 
Toro, 2013) and hypothesize that Chinese 
aid and trade can sustain the development of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, providing 
economic growth, a strategic economic model 
and a strong trade partner. The World Bank (De 
la Torre et al., 2011) supports the hypothesis 
of a sustained long-term economic growth 
“made in China” even after the 2008 economic 
crisis, assuming that Chinese growth is long-
lasting and stable. In fact, the growing relation 
between China and LAC provides an historic 
opportunity to the region for unprecedented 
progress to rebalance its gaps in productivity, 
innovation, infrastructure, logistics, and 
capacity-building. Cooperation with China, 
in the context of the 2015-2019 Cooperation 
Plan, could lead to a rethinking of the regional 
industrial policy, leading to a greater processing 
of raw materials, better linked to manufacturing 
and services sectors, and fuelling intraregional 
trade (Leiteritz, 2012).
Others authors, on the contrary, have a 
more pessimistic approach, and maintain that 
Chinese unconditional aid and trade, while 
triggering short-term growths in Latin American 
economies, will not be able to sustain them in 
the long-term. Chinese “no-strings attached” 
approach towards developing regions is 
detrimental of business’s best-practices, 
human rights and good governance (Roett 
& Paz, 2008, Curran, 2016). Unconditional 
aid will continue to represent an alternative 
to conditional Western foreign aid, hindering 
governance reforms and allowing corruption and 
inefficiencies to survive, especially in resource 
rich countries. Furthermore, a concentration 
on raw resources combined with an increased 
competition from China in manufacturing 
markets could discourage innovative 
technologies and productivity, sparking fears of 
“deindustrialization” in the region, in particular 
in Brazil and Chile (Hearn & León-Manríquez, 
2011, p.246). The deceleration of Chinese 
economy (which “only” grew by a 7% in 2015 
and by 6.9% in 2016), slowing down Chinese 
demand of raw materials and causing a drop 
in their price, intensifies doubts about long-
term sustainability of the Sino-Latin American 
relationship. 
Conclusion
During the last decade, China has risen as 
a very visible actor in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). It has done so in a variety 
of manners, mainly through its foreign aid, its 
investments and its bilateral trade. The first 
section of this article provided an overview of 
the historical evolution of Chinese aid to the 
region, showing how Chinese cooperation, 
from a series of small actions directed mainly 
to communist countries all around the world, 
became a full scale worldwide aid program, 
active in all regions of the developing world; 
furthermore, it summarized the approach to 
cooperation with LAC for each phase. The 
second section of this article offered an attempt 
to quantify the amount of Chinese aid received 
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by LAC as compared to other developing 
regions, confirming the worldwide approach 
of Chinese aid. It also showed that while Sub-
Saharan Africa is by far the region receiving 
the most aid in terms of aid projects, in the last 
decade Latin America and the Caribbean has 
seen its share sharply rise in terms of amount 
of aid allocated, passing from less than 5% 
to 20% of total Chinese aid budget. The third 
section assessed three main group of motives 
which may drive China to provide aid: though 
the need of the recipient and the institutional 
characteristics of the beneficiary are not 
relevant, political motives such the recognition 
of Taiwan may have an effect; furthermore, 
Chinese aid is openly directed to benefit the 
economic and commercial interests of the 
donor country, especially regarding its energy 
and raw material needs. In fact, privileging a 
South-South cooperation approach (which 
diverges from the classical humanitarian 
model of aid), Chinese official policy is formally 
described as a win-win approach: on the one 
hand China strongly needs big amounts of oil 
and raw materials for its energy and production 
needs; on the other hand, LAC need a buyer 
for their abundant natural resources, and they 
also need Chinese foreign aid and investments 
for their development goals. Finally, the fourth 
section consisted in an appraisal of the 
potential benefits and negative impacts of the 
Sino-LAC relationship, finding among potential 
concerns the unconditionality of Chinese 
foreign aid and its unbalanced trade relationship 
with the region. In light of the strategic and 
economic comprehensive analysis of Chinese 
unconditional aid and bilateral trade to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, we may conclude 
that China certainly provides short and medium 
term growth to the region, but it is more difficult 
to talk of a long term sustainable advancement, 
unless LAC governments succeed in diversifying 
their economies, avoiding exposing themselves 
to drops in the price of natural resources. 
Undoubtedly China will be a long-lasting ally 
to the region and partnerships with China are 
not to fear; however, there is a relatively high 
possibility of difficult times ahead, and LAC 
governments need to take steps to be prepared 
beforehand.
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